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COMMENTS
bad. So many factors enter into the determination of its use that each situation must be considered in the light of its own merits. For this reason it
is impractical to list fully the benefits and the disadvantages, but it is advisable to weigh them when considering the use of the estate.
The greatest advantage to the parties is that the entirety is a convenient
means of protecting the surviving spouse from the tedious administration of
the decedent's estate. Then, too, it is a means of protection against improvident debts of either of the parties. It is in these that the estate finds its
peculiar and justifiable function. 7
On the other side of the ledger, taxing in the entireties does not usually work in favor of the estate.8 8 Also, it is impossible for one of the
spouses to obtain credit or to mortgage the estate without the joinder of the
other. The rule, which requires such a joinder of the parties when encumbering the estate, protects the entirety against mismanagement by one party.
Conversely, it has not left room for the situation where, for economic reasons, mortgaging would be advisable, but cannot be accomplished because
of the unwillingness of one of the parties to join for some underlying and
usually sentimental reason.
HOWARD ALAN MEYERS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION
AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
The Supreme Court in Amalgamated Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Board' has recently declared the Wisconsin Public Anti-Strike
law to be inoperative. Because of this ruling, the W.E.R.B. has been shorn
of its power to check strikes in public utilities. Provisions quite similar to
those in the Wisconsin act exist in many states, 2 and the present decision
affects their status as law. This article will compare some of the other important and similar statutes with the instant case in an attempt to render a
valid opinion as to their position as law.
STATE STATUTES
In the Amalgamated case, the Court interpreted the effect and applicability of the NLRA of 1935,3 as amended by the LMRA of 1947, 4 and
found in a 6-3 decision that the state statute was in conflict with the
federal regulation and could not be permitted to be enforced. It was de87.
88.

Fairclaw v. Forrest, 130 F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
See note 54 suora.

I.71 Sup. Ct. 359 (1951).
2. Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia.
3. 49 STAT. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1946).

4. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. 1949).
5. WIs. STAT. § 111.50 (1947).
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terinined that Congress had regulated peaceful strikes in industries affecting
commerce, and expressly safeguarded the "right" to engage in concerted
action for the purpose of collective bargaining. Because the parties who
were involved in the dispute had to' submit themselves to compulsory arbitration in Wisconsin and could not engage in a strike or other concerted
action, the Court held that this was an abridgement of labor's "right"
and therefore a direct conflict existed. The act of Congress7 is the supreme
law of the land and state law must yield when in conflict with it.' The contention was asserted that Congress had intended to leave "local emergency"
disputes to the state to regulate. The Court said that the \Visconsin act
was far from being confined solely to emergencies9 and refused to consider
this argument. It then cursorily disposed of this matter by reasserting that
Congress intended to close the field of peaceful strikes to state legislation.
The statutes under consideration here will all be compared to the
decision in the Amalgamated case as if that controversy had arisen within
the jurisdiction of each state. Basically the statutes of all the states which
have regulated the activities of public utilities have been based upon "police
power"-to promulgate and protect the best interests and welfare of the
populace. The policy is to facilitate the settlement of labor disputes in
these public utilities and to provide the procedures necessary to effect this
desired end. The diverse procedures as enumerated in the various acts usually
become effective if and when the collective bargaining process threatens
to or does in fact reach a point where it can no longer be used to avert a
strike.' 0
Florida, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Michigan
The Florida statute1 does not specifically require that the disputing
parties enter into compulsory arbitration as does the Wisconsin act. However, when the collective bargaining process is frustrated by a deadlock,
either party to the dispute may petition to the governor for the appointment of a conciliator.' 2 The governor in his discretion has the power to
appoint one, and, only when conciliation fails, can lie appoint a board of
arbitration. 3 It is a misdemeanor for anyone to violate the provisions of
this act, and a fine of not more than $1,000 and not more than twelve
months in jail must be paid and served by the violator.' 4 Should a strike or
6. Id. at § 111.55.
7. See note 4 supra.

8. U.S. CoNsr. Art. VI.

9. See note 1 supra ("the act has been applied to disputes national in scope.").
10. FLA. STAT. § 453.01 el seq. (1949); IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2401 et seq. (Burns
Supp. 1949); MAss. AiN. LAws c. 150B (1949); MicH. CoMP. LAws § 423 et seq.
(1948); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10178 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1950); N.J. Rv. STAT.
§ 34.133 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1948-49-50); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 213 et seq.
(Supp. 1950); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-75 ot seq. (1950).
11. FLA. STAT. § 453.01 et seq. (1949).
12. Id. at § 453.04.
13. Id. at § 453.06.
14. Id. at § 453.12.
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walkout be actually engaged in, then $10,000 per day is to be paid by the
offending party. 1 Any party who is injured by the violation of this act may
ask for an injunction or restraining order.'
The Indiana, 17 Pennsylvania' 8 and Michigan'9 statutes are for the most
part similar to Florida. The intent of all, similar to Wisconsin's, is to eliminate concerted work stoppage and lockouts in public utilities. They differ
from the Florida law as to the penalty to be imposed for violating the act.
2
Indiana merely stipulates that violation will constitute a misdemeanor;
Pennsylvania 2 1 provides for a fine of not less than $500 or more than $2,500
22
and/or imprisonment for not more than six month; and Michigan provides for a fine of $1,000 or six months in jail, or both. As in Florida, the
vests in any person who is ad.
right to the injunctive process in these 2states
3
act.
the
of
violation
by
versely affected
It is evident, from the reading of these statutes, that while compulsory
arbitration is not expressly provided for, the failure to comply with the procedure of the statutes would place the parties in an unenviable position.
A fine of $10,000 per day is no small sum to be paid for the privilege of
striking, and certainly appears to be a measure designed to force the parties
to arbitrate. The fact that, aside from Florida, the other states provide" for
less stringent measures cannot overshadow the fundamental factor found
in each of the statutes-to stop concerted activity and to restrict that which
Congressional action allows. Te effect of these statutes appears to be no
less calculated to produce compulsory arbitration than if it had been an
express stipulation in one of the clauses. These acts read in the light of the
decision on the Wisconsin statute 24 can be no iiore effective than was that
statute.
Missouri

The Missouri law provides for a State Board of Mediation to effect a
settlement of labor disputes in the public utilities.2 Only when this board
fails to resolve the problem must the parties submit to compulsory arbitration.2 1 If arbitration is not the proper measure and the participants still
cannot agree, the state in its discretion may seize the plant and operate it
until such a time as a satisfactory solution is reached by the parties. 27 This
15. Id. at f 453,13.
16. Id,at § 453.14.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

IND. ANN. STAT. § 40.2401 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1949).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 213 et seq. (Supp. 1950).

Mrcn. CoMP. LAws § 423 et seq. (1948).
See note 17 su~ra, at § 40-2413.
See note 18 supra, at § 214.
See note 19 supra, at § 423-22.
See note 17 at § 40-2414; note 18 at § 215; note 19 at § 423.22a.
See note 5 sura.
25. Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10178.103 (Cum. Supp. 1950).
26. Id,at § 10178.118a.
27. Id. at § 10178.119.
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28
statute also allows for restraint and injunctive proceedings for violation
9
and the penalty imposed is the same as in the Florida act. Thus, the
Missouri statute appears to be in conflict with the NLRA to an even greater
extent, if possible, than the Wisconsin act. Once the Court has held the
Wisconsin statute illegal, and it has been determined here that the Missouri
act is a more extreme deviation from the NLRA, it seems to necessarily
follow that this act would be unenforceable.

New Jersey
The procedure in the New Jersey act 0 differs from the others already
mentioned in that sixty days notice must be given to the State Board ot
Mediation if there is an intention to strike or have a lockout.,' If no satisfactory mediation occurs during this period, and a strike or lockout affecting
general public welfare is in progress, the governor may seize and operate
4
8
the facilities of the utility. 2 A $10,000 penalty provision, as in Florida"
35
and Missouri is present in this statute, and tends to be a coercive measure
intending to force compliance with mediation and arbitration procedures.
Though this act deviates slightly from the others, because of the notice required, it is in effect the same, for purposes of forcing compulsory arbitration upon the parties. Thus, it too most likely will fail along with the Wisconsin, Florida, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Missouri statutes.
Massachusetts
When the collective bargaining procedure in Massachusetts ceases to
function, the Commissioner of Labor and Industry may certify this fact
to the governor who then may appoint a moderator to induce the parties
to submit to arbitration, or request directly that the parties submit to voluntary arbitration.8 8 If the parties refuse to abide by either request, the governor, if necessary, may declare a period of emergency and he may either
enter into arrangements for the continuance of plant operations or seize
the plant.3 7 The Commonwealth is the only party entitled to legal or
equitable relief for disobedience of this act,38 and there is to be no concerted
cessation of work or lockout during this emergency. a The question of
whether the action of the Commonwealth is proper during this emergency
period is not discussed in the Amalgamated case. The power exercised by
the state does not require anything to be done by the parties to avoid a
strike, although they may voluntarily submit to arbitration. Therefore, the
6.
28. Id. at § 10178.121, cl.
4 and 5.
29. Id. at § 10178.121, cl.
30. N.J. REV. STAT. § 34:13B (Cum.Supp. 1948-49-50).
31. Id. at § 34:13B-7.
32. Id. at § 34:13B-13.
33. Id. at § 34:13B-24.
34. See note 14 supra.
35. See note 29 supra.
36. MAss. ANN. LAws c.150B-3A (1949).
37. Id. at c. 150B-4.
38. Id. at e. 150B-5.
39. Id. at c. 150B-3B.
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objectionable compulsive methods found in the other statutes are lacking
here. The period during which the state acts is one of emergency, and the
action of the state is a protective measure. This regulation is a reasonable
exercise of the police power of the state and is concurrent and supplementary to the federal action rather than in conflict with it. Logically,
because the state act is reasonable and not in conflict with the federal
statute, it is presumed that the courts would not or at least should not, interfere with its enforcement.
Virginia
In Virginia, 40 the governor may suggest voluntary arbitration to the
parties upon notice of a disagreement. 4 1 If the dispute continues and an
actual strike or lockout is in progress, or the threat of one is imminent he
may seize the plant.4 2 This action when exercised is for the public inter-

est.43 There are no penalty provisions in the statute, and as in Massachusetts, it becomes effective only when an emergency has arisen. 44 The
sovereign right to protect the people of the state appears to be properly
exercised here, and even in view of the case under discussion would apparently be permissable.
INTERSTATE C OMMERCE

The supremacy of federal legislation to state law is indisputably contained in the Constitution.45 However, the regulatory power applied by
Congress in the domain of interstate commerce is not necessarily exclusive.416 The power to regulate interstate commerce found in the Constitution 47 and interpreted by various cases48 has gone through many changes.
From the time of Gibbons v. Ogden 11 where the word "commerce" required interpretation so that navigation would be within its powers, to the
present, it must be conceded that this power has been expanded a great
deal. It is now used to regulate transportation. 0 radio,"' railroads, 52 waterpower, 3 securities,-4 taxation; 5 and other fields.

40.

VA. CODE ANN. § 40-75 (1950).
41. Id. at § 40-78.
42. Id.at § 40-79.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid. (Governor to seize when the action "will conistitute a serious menace or
threat to the public health... .
45. See note 8 supra.
46. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109
(1941); Cooley v. Board of Wardens. 12 How. 229 (U.S. 1851).
47. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §§ 8, 9.
48. United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); United
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U.S. 1 (1914).
49. 4 Wheat. I (U.S. 1824).
50. Houston and Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
51. Federal Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
52. Texas and N.O.R R. v. Brotherhood, 281 U.S. 548 (1930); Dayton-Goose
Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U.S. 456 (1924); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
53. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., supra note 48.
54. North American Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
55. Wagner v. City of Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919).
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Throughout this entire period of more extensive regulation by the federal government there still existed a certain vested right in the state to enact
legislation in this field. Though the Darby Lumber Co."' case determined
that the interstate commerce power was broad enough so that Congress
could regulate any subject even remotely connected with it, the Thompson'7
and Zook58 cases still preserved a certain limited right to the state.
The field of labor was entered into by the government in 1935 with
the passage of the NLRA. This was during the period of increasing regulation. The act dealt only with actions of employers, and at this time the
state was permitted to regulate those matters which were not covered by
the act. The amendment of 1947 restricted state action even more than
the original act in 1935.60 Several of the cases0 ' which arose out of litigation
based on this statute, however, indicated that in certain instances the state
would still be permitted to exercise dominion in the labor field. In Auto
Workers v. WERB, 2 a case where the Court allowed the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board to prevent systematic work stoppages because the
national act did not cover this type of action, it appeared that the NLRA
was not as all inclusive as it previously seemed. The O'Brien case 3 which
arose later, held the Michigan Labor Mediation law to be in conflict with
the federal statute. The result was that federal legislation once again tended
to assume its broad powers.
There is a definite distinction between the O'Brien64 and Amalgamated63 decisions. The former case affected a private manufacturing concern
engaged almost exclusively in interstate commerce; the latter was a public
utility operating in intrastate commerce. The decision in the Amalgamated
case is without the slightest regard for the positive need of the states to
exercise legislation for their own protectiofn. It reflects a strong tendency
on the part of the Court to allow complete federalistic monopolization in
the labor field. The need to curtail the strike was present at the time, but
the federal policy, 0 by virtue of the NLRA, was to allow this concerted
action. The Court might have averted the harsh effect of the decision and
achieved the same result by holding that in times of emergency the state
statute is applicable. The industries affected were local in nature and were
56. United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
57. California v. Thompson, supra note 46.
58. California v. Zook, suopra note 46; Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S.
261 (1943).
59. See note 3 suopra.
60. See note 4 supra.
61. Algoma Plywood Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); La Crosse Tel. Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18 (1949);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State LRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); Allen-Bradley
Local v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
62. 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
63. International Union of United Auto, CIO v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 404 (1950).
64. ibid.
65. See note 1 supra.
66. 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (Supp. 1949).
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not connissioned to operate upon an interstate level. It is quite conceivable
that a strike by this public utility could, if allowed to extend for a long
period of time, create within the state a serious emergency. Without gas,
lights, and transportation, the state would be crippled, and yet the national
government would be committed to non-intervention until a national emergency arose. The problem in cases such as this becomes a question of
which is more important, the public health, welfare, and interest, or the
right of the employer and employee to bargain without restriction. A distinction must be drawn between legislation for the control of ordinary
strikes and those which tend to create a state "emergency." While the right
to regulate peaceful strikes would remain within the federal control, the
states must not be deprived of the right to control local emergencies, since
there is a hiatus between the time when a state and national emergency
would occur.
IRWIN GARSKOF

